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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
V . 
PEARL TOPANOTES, 
Defendant/Petitioner 
CaseNo.2001027-SC 
In the underlying appeal to this case, Petitioner Pearl Topanotes challenged the 
trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. See State v. Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311, fflf3-8, 14 P.3d 695. 
According to the facts, the officers retained possession of Topanotes' property and 
detained her as a matter of routine practice to run a warrants check. The officers acknow-
ledged that at the time of the detention, they did not have reasonable suspicion to believe 
Topanotes was involved in criminal activity. See id.; also State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 
616, 617 (Utah 1987) (level-two detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion). 
During the unlawful detention, the officers discovered a warrant for Topanotes1 
arrest. They executed the warrant and searched her. The search produced heroin, which 
gave rise to the charge in this case. Topanotes moved in the trial court to suppress the 
evidence discovered during the unlawful detention, and the court denied the motion. 
On appeal, the state conceded the trial court erred in its ruling, where the officers 
lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to support the level-two detention. (State's Brief 
of Appellee, dated May 15, 2000 ("Brief of Appellee"), at 6.)1 
Notwithstanding the concession, the state asked the court of appeals to affirm the 
trial court's ruling on an alternative ground raised for the first time on appeal According 
to the state, the inevitable-discovery doctrine rendered the unlawfully seized evidence 
admissible under the Fourth Amendment. (Brief of Appellee at 7-11.) The state asked 
the court of appeals in a footnote to remand the case in order that the trial court may 
consider application of the inevitable discovery doctrine in this matter. (Id. at 11, n.3.) 
On November 9, 2000, the court of appeals issued a decision in the case. It ruled 
the officers violated Topanotes' Fourth Amendment rights when they unlawfully detained 
her for the warrants check. Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311, ^8. The court also considered 
the state's argument regarding inevitable-discovery. However, it refused to reach the 
merits of the issue. Instead, the court of appeals ordered a remand in the case to the trial 
court "for a factual determination on whether the heroin would have been inevitably 
discovered and for such proceedings as may be appropriate." Id. at^|12. 
This Court granted Topanotes' Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
In this Court, Topanotes is challenging the court of appeals' remand as it relates to 
the inevitable-discovery doctrine for two reasons. First, the court of appeals should have 
1 In papers filed with this Court, the state likewise has admitted the officers' conduct 
was unlawful. (State's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, dated March 
28, 2001, at 2-3 (state conceded that officers engaged in an unlawful detention); Brief of 
Respondent, dated January 15, 2002, at 2, 5-6 ("Brief of Resp.").) 
2 
resolved the issue on appeal, since the inevitable-discovery doctrine was raised first in 
that court as an alternative ground for affirmance. The court of appeals' failure to 
resolve the issue on the existing record constituted error. See infra. Argument. 
The state in part does not dispute that point; indeed, the state also is requesting 
resolution of the inevitable-discovery issue on the existing record. (See Brief of Resp. at 
15-21 .)2 That would be appropriate under Utah law and the doctrine of affirming on 
alternative grounds raised for the first time on appeal. To that end, this Court should find 
that the inevitable-discovery doctrine is not applicable here. See infra subpoint C, below. 
Second, Topanotes maintains that the court of appeals erred when it remanded the 
matter to the trial court for further proceedings, which may entail another evidentiary 
hearing. Such a remand would be unprecedented under Utah law. 
The state disagrees. It seems to claim that Utah appellate courts permit remand to 
allow an appellee to develop an issue in the trial court that it raised first on appeal. Accor-
ding to the state, if its theory on appeal lacks an evidentiary basis, it is the "practice1' in 
this jurisdiction (i) to remand the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing if the 
state is relying on a new theory on appeal; but (ii) to reject remand if the state is relying 
on the theory it originally developed in the trial court. (Brief of Resp. at 9.) 
2 The issue raised in the state's "Brief of Conditional Cross-Petitioner" is fairly included 
in the issues raised in Topanotes' Brief of Petitioner (October 4, 2001). Consequently, 
Topanotes has addressed the state's issue concerning application of the inevitable-
discovery doctrine in part in this Reply Brief. See infra subpoint C; Brief of Petitioner, 
dated October 4, 2001, at Point LB; see also Brief of Conditional-Cross Respondent. 
3 
The state's argument concerning the "practice" is not supported by relevant case 
law or analysis; it is unreasonable and should be disregarded for the reasons more fully 
discussed below. See infra subpoints A and B. 
As set forth herein, and as set forth in Topanotes' additional filings with this Court, 
the inevitable-discovery doctrine is inapplicable to this case. In addition, it was improper 
for the court of appeals to order remand for further proceedings on the matter. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
SHOULD BE REVERSED WITHOUT REMAND FOR FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS ON THE INEVITABLE-DISCOVERY DOCTRINE. 
Topanotes does not dispute that an appellate court may decide an issue raised for 
the first time on appeal as an alternative ground for affirmance. This Court has stated the 
following with respect to the doctrine: 
[I]t is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from 
"if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even 
though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the 
basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory was 
not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and 
was not considered or passed on by the lower court." 
Dipomav.McPhie, 2001 UT 61, Tfl8, 29 P.3d 1225 (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk 
Producers Ass'n. 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (Utah 1969)). 
Topanotes likewise does not take issue with the following assertion set forth in the 
state's brief: "This Court has previously recognized that affirmance on an alternative 
ground 'does not deprive a party of a due process [right],' and [] it is not a prerequisite of 
4 
the doctrine that the alternative ground first be raised in the trial court." (Brief of Resp. at 
10 (citing Dipoma; DeBrv v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995)).) 
Utah courts have specified that before an appellate court may affirm on an 
alternative ground raised first on appeal, the alternative ground must be apparent on the 
exiting record. See Dipoma, 2001 UT 61, [^18 ("because the alternative ground for 
affirmance presented by [appellee/petitioner] is apparent on the record and was briefed 
and argued by the parties on appeal, we choose to address if (emphasis added)); State v. 
Finlavson. 2000 UT 10, ^ 31, 994 P.2d 1243 (where the court has a "complete factual 
record" it "may affirm a judgment of a lower court if it is sustainable on any legal ground 
or theory apparent on the record"); Limb. 461 P.2d at 293 n.2 ("a trial court should be 
affirmed if on the record made it can be"); State v. Wells. 928 P.2d 386, 390-92 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996) (addressing and rejecting an alternative Fourth Amendment argument raised 
by the state for the "first time on appeal"), affd. State v. Wells. 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah 
1997) (unanimously affirming court of appeals' analysis); State v. Chevre. 2000 UT App 
6, f 12, 994 P.2d 1278 (appellate court may affirm where the legal ground raised first on 
appeal was "apparent on the record"); State v. Montova. 937 P.2d 145, 149-50 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997) {refusing to affirm on alternative ground raised first on appeal where the 
ground was not apparent on the record). 
Thus, under Utah law, if the record supports the appellee's alternative ground for 
affirmance, the appellate court will affirm the ruling of the lower court. See Chevre. 2000 
5 
UT App 6, fflfl2-17. On the other hand, if the record does not support the appellee's 
newly raised theory, the appellate court may either reject the argument, or decline to 
address it. See Dipoma, 2001 UT 61, Tfl8 (appellate court "choose[s],f to address 
alternative ground for affirmance that is apparent from the record); Wells, 928 P.2d at 
390-92 (addressing and rejecting appellee's alternative ground for affirmance where it 
was not supported by the record), affd, 939 P.2d 1204 (unanimously affirming court of 
appeals' analysis); Montoya, 937 P.2d at 150 (rejecting state's alternative ground for 
affirmance where the grounds were not supported by the record). 
The contrasting results set forth above represent the two sides of the same coin. 
Application of the doctrine is clear and workable. 
Under Utah law, this Court will not remand a case to the trial court for further 
proceedings on an issue raised first on appeal, except in limited circumstances. See Utah 
R. App. P. 23B (2001); State v. Litherland. 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92. 
The state takes a different view of the matter. It claims Utah appellate courts will 
remand some cases for another evidentiary hearing, where the state has raised a new 
theory on appeal as an alternative ground for affirmance. (See Brief of Resp. at 8-9.) 
That is, according to the state, the doctrine of "affirming on alternative grounds" 
exists on a "continuum." (Id 7-8.) On one end of the state's "continuum" is Limb, where 
the appellee has raised a new question of law as an alternative ground for affirmance. 
According to the state, if a question of law is raised first on appeal, the appellate court 
6 
will decide the issue without "trial court clarification or further fact-finding." (Id.) 
On the other end of the state's "continuum" is Montoya. where the appellee has 
raised a fact-sensitive issue as an alternative ground for affirmance. According to the 
state, if a fact-sensitive issue is raised for the first time on appeal and it is "clearly 
rebutted in the record," the appellate court may resolve — and reject — the issue. (Id. at 8.) 
The state claims that while Limb and Montoya "represent opposite ends of the 
alternative grounds continuum" (Brief of Resp. at 7), all other matters exist somewhere 
between those cases (the "in-between" cases (see id. at 9)) and are not resolved on appeal; 
rather, the "in-between" cases are remanded to "the trial court to consider the adequacy of 
an alternative ground for affirmance in the first instance, which may entail an additional 
evidentiary hearing." (Brief of Resp. at 9.)3 
In support of its claim regarding the "in-between" cases, the state has cited to Renn 
v.Utah Board of Pardons. 904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995); State v. Strain. 779 P.2d 221 (Utah 
1989); State v. Palmer. 803 P.2d 1249 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); and State v. Marshall. 791 
P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied. 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990), rejected in part by 
3 By definition, the state's theory is incorrect. The doctrine of affirming on 
alternative grounds is an appellate concept. See Black's Law Dictionary at 59 (7th ed. 
1999) (to "affirm" is "to confirm on appear). The appellate court accepts or rejects the 
newly raised theory on appeal on the existing record as a possible ground for affirmance. 
If the doctrine of "affirming on alternative grounds" applied only to issues on the 
"opposite ends" of the state's "continuum" (Brief of Resp. at 7), it would not be called 
the doctrine of affirming on alternative grounds. It would be the doctrine of "remanding" 
an issue raised first on appeal for resolution in another tribunal. 
7 
State v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99,1fi|44, 47, 37 P.3d 1073. Those cases do not support the 
state's argument, as set forth below. The state's argument for remand must be rejected. 
A. THE STATE'S RELIANCE ON RENN. STRAIN. PALMER. AND 
MARSHALL IS MISPLACED. 
1. The State Claims Renn. Strain. Marshall, and Palmer. Support the "Utah 
Practice" to Remand a Fact-Sensitive Issue to the Trial Court for an Additional 
Evidentiary Hearing and Consideration of an Alternative Ground Raised for the 
First Time on Appeal. The Cases Do Not Support that Proposition. 
(a) Renn v. Utah Board of Pardons. 904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995). 
The state has cited to Renn in connection with its claim that this Court has 
"remanded [a case] for consideration of alternative grounds for affirmance, including 
further evidentiary hearing." (Brief of Resp. 7.) Renn does not stand for that proposition. 
In Renn, a prison inmate filed a petition in district court for post-conviction relief 
against the Board of Pardons. Renn, 904 P.2d at 680. The inmate made several claims 
against the Board concerning his parole date and the date set for his next parole hearing. 
Without reaching the merits of the petition, the trial court dismissed the matter on the 
basis that it was barred by a three-month statute of limitations. Id. 
The inmate appealed and the court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling; it 
found the statute of limitations unconstitutional. See kL 
Thereafter, the Board asked this Court to review the matter. This Court granted 
the request. Id at 679-80. On review, among other things, the Board asked this Court to 
affirm the trial court's dismissal on alternative grounds: the Board claimed the petition 
8 
was frivolous, and it claimed the court of appeals "should have canvassed the record for 
an alternative basis upon which to affirm the district court's11 dismissal. Id. at 684-85. 
This Court rejected the Board's alternative arguments. It also affirmed "the Court 
of Appeals' reversal and remand[ed the case] to the district court for an evaluation of the 
issues raised in Renn's petition." Id. at 685 (emphasis added). 
Contrary to the state's assertion, Renn does not stand for the proposition that a 
case may be remanded to the trial court for the appellee to develop an alternative theory 
raised first on appeal. (Brief of Resp. at 7.) Rather, under Renn if a trial court improperly 
dismisses a petitioner's claims, the claims may be reinstated and litigated on the merits. 
(b) State v. Strain. 779P. 2d 221 (Utah 1989). 
Next, the state claims in Strain, this Court "remand[ed] for an evidentiary hearing 
on possible alternative ground for affirmance, i.e., voluntariness of confession." (Brief of 
Resp. at 7.) That is incorrect. In Strain, the state did not argue an alternative ground for 
affirmance. Strain, 779 P.2d 221. Rather, this Court considered whether a motion to sup-
press should be reversed on grounds raised first in the trial court, but not decided there. 
In Strain, defendant filed a motion to suppress a confession obtained in violation of 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The trial court ultimately denied the motion, 
and proceeded to trial on the charges, which resulted in a conviction. On appeal, 
defendant challenged the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress on three grounds. 
First, the defendant claimed the Miranda warnings were defective. Strain, 779 
9 
P.2d at 223. This Court disagreed. Id. at 224. Second, the defendant claimed he did not 
knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to remain silent and his right to counsel during 
the interrogation. Id. at 224. This Court disagreed. Id. at 225. 
Third, the defendant claimed the officer obtained the confession through coercion. 
Id. at 225. This Court looked to the evidence of record and case law, it recognized the 
officer's tactics were coercive, then it ruled that because the trial court did not address the 
merits of that issue below, the case must be remanded. Id. at 227; see id. at 222 (in the 
original trial court proceedings defendant challenged the confession because of "threats 
and promises" made by the officer). Since the coercion issue in Strain was raised first in 
the trial court, but not decided there, it was appropriate to remand the matter to that court 
for a determination. See Rucker v. Dalton. 598 P.2d 1336, 1338-39 (Utah 1979) (this 
Court will remand an issue that was presented to the trial court but not decided). 
This Court did not remand the case in Strain for an evidentiary hearing on an alter-
native ground for affirmance raised first on appeal. Thus, Strain is not applicable here. 
(c) State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249 (Utah Ct App. 1990). 
Next, the state claims Palmer is "similar to this case." (Brief of Resp. at 7.) That is 
incorrect. In Palmer, defendant moved to suppress a ring discovered during a warrantless 
X-ray search of his body. In the original trial court proceedings, the state argued the ring 
was admissible under alternative Fourth Amendment theories: First, the state claimed the 
X-ray search was lawful under an "exigent circumstances" exception; and second, the 
10 
state "raised the theory of inevitable discovery." Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1253. The trial court 
upheld the search under the state's first theory, idL at 1251, and defendant appealed. 
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling on the "exigent circum-
stances" exception, id. at 1253, and remanded the case to the trial court for a decision on 
the inevitable-discovery issue, id, since it was first raised in that court. Id. 
Under the law, it is proper to remand a case to the trial court for a decision on an 
issue that was originally raised there. See Rucker, 598 P.2d at 1338-39. Since the state in 
Topanotes' case did not raise inevitable-discovery in the trial court, Palmer is 
inapplicable. There is no basis in this matter to remand the case. 
(d) State v. Marshall 791 P. 2d 880 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Finally, the state claims Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, is applicable here. In Marshall 
the court of appeals granted a petition for interlocutory appeal to consider a ruling on a 
motion to suppress. Marshall 791 P.2d at 881. According to the evidence, the officer 
initiated a traffic stop because defendant had malfunctioning equipment. Id The officer 
became suspicious that defendant was transporting drugs when defendant responded to 
questions in a manner in conflict with the car rental agreement. The officer requested 
consent to search the car. When he came upon suitcases in the trunk, defendant claimed 
they did not belong to him. Id. at 882. The officer discovered drugs in the suitcases. Id 
On interlocutory appeal, defendant claimed he did not give consent to search the 
suitcases. The state responded that defendant lacked standing to challenge the search, 
11 
where he represented the suitcases did not belong to him. Apparently, neither party 
focused on the search of the suitcases in the trial court proceedings. Id, at 887. Never-
theless, on interlocutory appeal, both parties agreed the issues relating to the suitcases 
were pivotal to the matter. See kL Given the "critical" importance of the newly raised 
issues by the parties, the court of appeals remanded the interlocutory appeal for rehearing 
on those specific matters. Id. at 890. Marshall is unique, where each party raised new 
arguments on interlocutory appeal, necessitating remand for additional proceedings. 
Marshall also is distinguishable from this case. The defendant in Marshall chal-
lenged the consent to search the suitcases for the first time on appeal. See Marshall, 791 
P.2d at 887. Topanotes has not raised any new issue here. Where both parties in 
Marshall considered their respective new positions on appeal to be "pivotal" to the matter, 
remand would satisfy both parties' need to resolve those respective issues. Topanotes 
does not consider the inevitable-discovery doctrine to be "pivotal" or "critical" here. 
Topanotes maintains it is inapplicable. See infra, subpoint C. 
Unlike the parties in Marshall Topanotes is not requesting remand in order to 
resolve additional issues relating to the search and raised for the first time on appeal. 
2. The State Has Failed to Cite to Any Authority for Its "Continuum" Theory. 
The cases cited by the state do not support the proposition that Utah appellate 
courts "have remanded for consideration of alternative grounds for affirmance, including 
further evidentiary hearing[s], under circumstances similar to this case." (Brief of Resp. 
12 
at 7.) In fact, the cases cited by the state are inapplicable. See Horton v. Goldmine^s 
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Utah 1989) (where the case law cited by a party failed to 
provide relevant analysis for the issue before the Court, the case law was not persuasive 
to this Court or dispositive of the matter); see State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, [^6 n.2, 31 P.3d 
528 (state relied on case law that was not dispositive). 
In sum, the courts in Strain and Palmer did not consider an alternative ground for 
affirmance raised for the first time on appeal; the Court in Renn rejected the state's alter-
native ground for affirmance and remanded the case to reinstate Renn's claims in the 
post-conviction petition; and the court in Marshall found that remand was critical to both 
parties, where each party raised new, "pivotal11 issues that required resolution. The state's 
request for remand here is not supported by case law. It should be rejected. 
B. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT FOR REMAND ON THE "IN-
BETWEEN"CASES MUST BE REJECTED FOR POLICY REASONS. 
It is well settled that the state bears the burden of establishing the admissibility of 
evidence under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 
(Utah 1993) (state bears burden of establishing admissibility under the Fourth 
Amendment); State v. James. 2000 UT 80, ^ }16, 13 P.3d 576 (prosecutor bears burden of 
proof for application of inevitable-discovery doctrine). 
If the state fails to present a sufficient evidentiary basis to support an officer's 
conduct under the Fourth Amendment, the evidence discovered during an unlawful search 
will be suppressed. See State v. Hodson, 907 P.2d 1155, 1159-60 (Utah 1995). 
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Also, where the state has failed in its evidentiary burden, it is not entitled to an 
order remanding the matter to the trial court for another evidentiary hearing. See State v. 
Case. 884 P.2d 1274, 1278-80 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (state failed to present sufficient evi-
dence to support seizure; the state would not be allowed to cure deficiencies on remand); 
Hodson, 907 P.2d at 1159-60 (the state carried the burden of proof; the state would not be 
entitled to remand for new evidence); State v. Gutierrez. 864 P.2d 894, 903 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) (where the statefs argument lacked an evidentiary basis on appeal, state would 
not be entitled to remand); Barnett v. United States, 525 A.2d 197, 200 (D.C. 1987); Ex 
Parte Hergott 588 So. 2d 911, 916 (Ala. 1991) (remand would violate Double Jeopardy 
Clause; state does not get second chance); see also State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1121 
(Utah App. 1997) (remand ordered for further proceedings on the "evidence previously 
presented to the trial court1'); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1140 (Utah 1994) (remand 
for findings); State v. Genovesi, 871 P.2d 547, 548-50, 552 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (remand 
for findings on the existing record), connected case. State v. GenovesL 909 P.2d 916, 919 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995); Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979) (remand for 
proper findings in accordance with the evidence of record). 
The state does not dispute the fundamental principles set forth above. The state 
likewise does not dispute the law as set forth in Case, Hodson, and Gutierrez, prohibiting 
remand for further evidentiary proceedings; or the law as set forth in Giron, Lopez, 
Genovesi, and Rucker, allowing remand only for findings on the existing record. 
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Rather, the state seems to argue that the cases cited above support competing stan-
dards under Utah law. According to the state, on the one hand, Utah appellate courts 
prohibit further evidentiary hearings on remand if the state has failed to present sufficient 
evidence to support a theory originally presented in the trial court, while Utah courts 
allow remand for another evidentiary hearing if the state raises a new theory on appeal as 
an alternative ground for affirmance. (See Brief of Resp. at 7-9.) 
The state's competing standards are unreasonable. The differing standards serve to 
reward the prosecutor who withholds evidence and argument in the original proceedings. 
Such a prosecutor would be entitled to have his case remanded on appeal for another 
evidentiary hearing on a new theory if the facts and argument originally presented in the 
trial court failed on appeal, while the prosecutor who endeavored to present all evidence 
and argument relevant to the matter in the original proceedings would be denied remand, 
as set forth in Case, Hodson, and Gutierrez. 
To the extent such competing standards could exist under Utah law, the standards 
would encourage prosecutors to test an initial theory in the trial court and to keep an 
alternative theory in reserve until an appeal in the case. On appeal, the prosecutor, lying 
in wait, would present a fresh argument for affirming the trial court's ruling, and would be 
assured remand if the case could not be upheld on the original theory. Conceivably, if the 
prosecutor had several alternative theories to test an appeal at a time, a criminal defendant 
could expect repeated trips to the appellate court, several evidentiary hearings, protracted 
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litigation, and no foreseeable resolution. Such a practice would invite abuse. 
Also, the state's argument for the competing standards is in conflict with the rules 
of criminal procedure. According to Rule 1, "These rules are intended and shall be con-
strued to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination of 
unnecessary expense and delay." Utah R. Crim. P. 1(b). Under the rules, the state should 
not be entitled to another hearing on remand if it has withheld evidence and argument in 
the original proceedings. Such a practice would undermine the purpose of the rule. 
As a matter of due process, Fourth Amendment law, and simple logic, since the 
state has the burden of establishing the admissibility of evidence obtained during a 
warrantless search, the factual predicate for the admissibility of such evidence must be 
fully developed before appeal. The state is bound by the record it created during the 
evidentiary hearing in the original trial court proceedings.4 If a proper factual predicate 
has not been developed to justify application of a Fourth Amendment doctrine, the state is 
not entitled to yet another bite at the apple. Under Utah law, it would be improper and 
fundamentally unfair to remand a case for further proceedings on a Fourth Amendment 
4 In practice, where the trial prosecutor investigates the facts and the law relating to the 
state's argument for admissibility of the evidence under the Fourth Amendment, it is 
reasonable to assume the prosecutor is informed of all relevant facts at the time of the ori-
ginal evidentiary hearing. Since the prosecutor has ethical obligations as they relate to 
matters presented in the trial court, the trial prosecutor likely has determined which argu-
ments may be pursued in good faith, and which arguments must be discarded. See Utah 
R. Prof. Cond. 3.8, comment ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice 
and not simply that of an advocate"). The prosecutor likely did not argue the alternative 
ground for affirmance here because it was inapplicable. See Wells, 928 P.2d at 391 n.7. 
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issue in order that the state may present additional evidence on a new theory. 
In State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346, 37 P.3d 270, {petition for cert, filed on 
other grounds), Case No. 20020002SC, the court of appeals refused to remand a case to 
the trial court for further proceedings on the state's argument for application of the 
inevitable-discovery doctrine. Warren is similar to this case where the state failed in the 
original trial court proceedings to adequately develop the alternative argument. 
In Warren, the court stated the following: 
The State argues that even if the search was unlawful, this case should be 
remanded to the trial court to determine if the seizure of cocaine and paraphernalia 
from Warren's person was nonetheless justified under the "inevitable discovery" 
exception to the exclusionary rule. "Inevitable discovery is a valid exception to 
the exclusionary rule[.]" State v. Topanotes, 2000 UT App 31 l,1j 10, 14 P.3d 695. 
However, under the inevitable discovery doctrine, the State has the burden to "'es-
tablish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately would 
have been discovered by lawful means.'" Id. (quoting [James, 2000 UT 80,]f 16]). 
In making its argument, the State correctly points out that the trial court did 
not make findings of fact addressing this issue. The State argues the trial court 
should have the opportunity to do so now. However, in so arguing the State fails 
to recognize that this lack of findings relevant to inevitable discovery was not due 
to some lapse or oversight by the trial court, or even to a mistake of law. Rather, 
the State failed to timely advance the theory or present evidence to support it. 
Although the State bore the burden of proving that the evidence would 
inevitably have been discovered by lawful means, not one word about inevitable 
discovery was mentioned during the suppression hearing itself. No evidence in 
contemplation of that theory was introduced by the State, nor was it mentioned in 
the brief oral argument that concluded the hearing. Rather, the idea surfaced for 
the first time only in subsequent briefing and a later round of oral arguments when 
it was raised, with apologies for its untimeliness, by a different prosecutor than the 
one who handled the actual suppression hearing. 
Warren, 2001 UT App 346, 1fl[l7-l9. 
In Topanotes' case, the state had two opportunities in the trial court to present 
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evidence or argument relating to admissibility of the evidence under the Fourth Amend-
ment. On July 15, 1999, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing where the state called 
witnesses to testify. At the end of the hearing, the state presented argument for admissi-
bility of the evidence. When the court asked for further argument, the prosecutor passed. 
(R. 88:47-57.) On July 28, 1999, before the trial court ruled on the motion to suppress, 
the prosecutor again had an opportunity to supplement the record. When the trial court 
invited both counsel to present additional argument, the prosecutor submitted the matter 
based on the evidence and arguments already contained in the record. (R. 98:3.) 
Prior to the trial court's ruling, the prosecutor could not have known whether the 
judge would suppress the evidence or find it admissible. Since the state's argument went 
to the admissibility of the evidence under the Fourth Amendment, the prosecutor should 
have presented all argument relevant to the matter. The prosecutor chose the argument he 
would pursue based on his investigation of the facts and circumstances. He chose not to 
argue any alternative theory for admissibility of the evidence. See supra note 4, herein. 
"Here, the trial court was presented with a presumably conscious decision," Litherland, 
2000 UT 76, %31, by the prosecutor, where he twice represented to the court that he had 
nothing further to add in connection with the motion to suppress. 
If this Court were to allow another evidentiary hearing for development of a theory 
the prosecutor chose not to pursue below, such a practice would create an incentive for 
abusive practices. The state's argument for remand must be rejected. 
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C. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THE STATE'S "CONTINUUM" THEORY 
EXISTS. THIS CASE FALLS ON THE MONTOYA SIDE. WHERE THE 
RECORD "CLEARLY REBUTS" THE STATE'S CLAIMS FOR APPLICATION 
OF THE INEVITABLE-DISCOVERY DOCTRINE. 
Even if the state is correct about the "continuum," where some issues raised first 
on appeal may be remanded for another hearing (see Brief of Resp. at 7-9), the state's 
newly raised theory in this case falls on the Montoya side of the "continuum." The record 
here "clearly rebuts" application of the new theory. (Id.); see Montoya, 937 P.2d at 150 
(rejecting state's alternative ground, where it was not supported by sufficient "uncontro-
verted evidence"); Wells, 928 P.2d at 390-92 (rejecting state's argument raised first on 
appeal, where the argument was not supported), affd, 939 P.2d 1204 (unanimously 
affirming court of appeals' analysis). Remand for another hearing is inappropriate. 
In this case, the state claims inevitable-discovery applies based on the following: 
The inevitable discovery rule allows the admission of evidence if, "'the 
prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information 
ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.'" Indeed, the 
issue in determining "inevitable discovery" is what would have occurred if the 
investigation had continued without the illegality. Thus, the inevitable discovery 
rule permits "the prosecution to purge the taint of illegally obtained evidence by 
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such evidence inevitably would 
have been discovered, absent the illegality, by proper and predictable police 
investigative procedures." 
(Brief of Resp. at 16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).)5 
5 The state also claims the following: "The majority of the courts follow the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which requires no absolute proof, beyond evidence of 
predictable police routine, of what would have hypothetically occurred absent the 
illegality." (Brief or Resp. at 16 (citing U.S. v. Larsen. 127 F.3d 984, 987 (10th Cir. 
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In its brief, the state admits the illegality in this case occurred when the police 
escalated the voluntary encounter with Topanotes to a level-two detention without 
reasonable suspicion. See Deitman. 739 P.2d at 617-18 (level-two detention must be 
supported by reasonable suspicion). The officers "failed to return [Topanotes5] identifica-
tion before running the warrants check"; "the detention was not justified by reasonable 
suspicion"; and the "detention engendered by retaining [Topanotes'] identification [for 
the purpose of the warrants check] was not justified under the Fourth Amendment." 
(BriefofResp.at2, 19.) 
The state also acknowledges that the officers described the process for obtaining 
Topanotes' identification and running the warrants check as a "routine procedure" or 
"common practice." (Brief of Resp. at 19); see also R. 88:15-16 (Officer Hansen 
admitted the officers called in the warrants check as a matter of "routine procedure" and 
1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 1140 (1998)).) That statement is misleading. 
In Larsen the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit looked to the 
primary facts of record to support application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine. A 
complete discussion of Larsen is set forth in the opening Brief of Petitioner at 16-20. In 
sum, an officer in Larsen unlawfully seized defendant's bank records and forwarded them 
to an agent for investigation. A bank vice-president also independently forwarded 
defendant's records to a federal agent. A subsequent investigation of the records led to 
grand jury proceedings and charges against defendant for fraud. Id. at 985. The defendant 
moved to suppress the records that were unlawfully seized by the officer. The district 
court and the court of appeals ruled that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applied to the 
matter. Id at 986. According to the facts, the FBI agent inevitably would have 
discovered the fraud through lawful means, where the bank vice-president also forwarded 
information to the agent. The evidence in Larsen supporting inevitable-discovery was 
non-speculative and certain. See Nix v. Williams. 467 U.S. 431, 444 n.5 (1984) (the 
inevitable-discovery doctrine is not based in speculation). 
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not because they suspected any criminal activity on Topanotes' part). 
Officer Mitchell testified to his "common practice" as follows: "As I walked up, 
[Officer Hansen] handed me [Topanotes'] identification and I don't recall if he asked me 
to run her for warrants or if I just ran her for warrants. It's a common practice." (R. 
88:21-22.) Mitchell also admitted that he did not have reason to suspect that Topanotes 
was involved in criminal activity. (R. 88:28.) The evidence supports that Mitchell's 
common practice was to detain individuals for the purpose of running a warrants check, 
even where he did not have reasonable suspicion to support the detention. 
Since the officers here routinely detained a person without reasonable suspicion 
when they ran a warrants check, they routinely crossed a constitutional line. 
To that end, the evidence rebuts the state's claim that a "routine procedure" may 
support inevitable discovery. Indeed, the routine procedure here was found to be unlaw-
ful. See Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311, *H2-8 (ruling detention for warrants check was 
unlawful). On that basis, the "routine procedure" cannot serve to support inevitable 
discovery. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 (state must show evidence ultimately would have 
been discovered by lawful means). 
Next, the state claims, "[i]f police here had merely viewed the identification, 
obtained the desired information, and promptly returned it, the warrants check would not 
have 'per se escalate[d] the encounter into a level two stop.'" (Brief of Resp. at 18.) That 
is irrelevant. The state might as well claim that if these officers followed Topanotes in 
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her daily tasks, they may observe jaywalking to support an arrest and a search incident 
thereto. Either way, the argument is based on hypothetical facts. That is inappropriate. 
Stated another way, the state's argument does not support predictable, inevitable 
discovery. If we were to assume for purposes of this appeal that officers considered 
running a warrants check without retaining Topanotes' card and without detaining her, it 
is unclear how the check would have occurred. Here, the officer who initially retained 
possession of the card (Officer Hansen) did not run the warrants check. Hansen took the 
identification card and reviewed it. If he had returned it to Topanotes, under the state's 
hypothetical, it is unclear how Officer Mitchell would have obtained Topanotes' 
identification to run the check. The state fails to explain that gap in the evidence. 
In that regard, the facts in this case rebut a situation where one officer would 
review the identification card and return it, while a second officer somehow would obtain 
the information to run a warrants check. See State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 764 (Utah 
1991) (the leap from asking a person's name to running a warrants check degenerated into 
an attempt to support an as yet "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch'"). 
Also, assuming arguendo the officers did not engage in an illegal detention, when 
Hansen hypothetically returned the card to Topanotes, was she free to go? If so, did she? 
If she left, the evidence of record in this case supports that the officers would not have 
conducted the warrants check. According to Hansen, he would have ended the encounter 
and discontinued any further investigation relating to Topanotes. (R. 88:17.) Those facts 
22 
clearly rebut the state's inevitable-discovery argument. 
Finally, even if we were to assume that the officers could continue the search with-
out detaining Topanotes, there is no way to know that officers "inevitably" would have 
found her after the check. Likewise, there is no way to know whether Topanotes would 
have changed her clothes, and if so, how officers would have discovered the drugs in the 
clothes she wore earlier. In short, the record fails to support "inevitable" discovery. 
Indeed, the state's argument simply raises unanswered questions and speculation. 
[T]here is absolutely no evidence in the record that would sustain findings in 
support of a determination that discovery of the drugs and paraphernalia on 
[defendant's] person would have been inevitable, along the lines theorized by the 
State on appeal, even [absent the illegality]. 
Warren, 2001 UT App 346, ^ [20. "There was no testimony that the officers would have 
been able to quickly locate" Topanotes after a warrants check since she was free to go, or 
that she "still would have had narcotics and paraphernalia on [her] person at the time of 
any such later encounter." Id at ^ [20. 
The state's speculative hypothetical for application of the inevitable-discovery 
doctrine is contrary to Nix. There, the United States Supreme Court specified that the 
inevitable-discovery doctrine must be supported by "demonstrated historical facts capable 
of ready verification or impeachment." Nix. 467 U.S. at 444, n.5. Application of the 
doctrine may not be based in speculation. See State v. Miller. 709 P.2d 225, 242 (Or. 
1985) ("[i]t is not enough to show that the evidence 'might' or 'could have been' 
otherwise obtained") (citing U.S. v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1983) (the officers 
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must be certain that evidence would otherwise have been found; it is not enough that 
lawful means of acquiring the evidence existed); U.S. v. Romero. 692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 
1982) (warning against resort to speculation, and stressing that the evidence in the case 
would have been discovered shortly through a lawful investigation already under way)). 
That is, the government must present basic, primary evidence of the lawful means 
that ultimately would have led to the discovery. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 448-49 (prosecution 
presented specific evidence to support that officers were searching roads, ditches, 
abandoned buildings, in area counties in an effort to find the body; continuation of the 
lawful search inevitably would lead to the body, which was actually discovered during an 
unlawful confession); see Brief of Petitioner, dated October 4, 2001, at 16-20. 
The state is unable to make that showing. The evidence refutes application of the 
inevitable-discovery doctrine in this case. 
D. IN THE END. IF REMAND IS ORDERED. IT MUST BE LIMITED TO A 
DETERMINATION ON THE EXISTING RECORD. 
As set forth in the opening Brief of Petitioner, Utah appellate courts have specified 
that remand is limited to the entry of findings based on the facts already exiting in the 
record. See Giron, 943 P.2d at 1121 (ordering remand "for the trial court to apply the law 
as set forth in this opinion on the evidence previously presented to the trial court at the 
hearing on the motion to suppress"); Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1140 (remand for findings under 
correct application of the law); Genovesl 871 P.2d at 548-50, 552 (remand for findings 
on the existing record), connected case. State v. Genovesu 909 P.2d at 919; Rucker, 598 
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P.2d at 1338-39 (remand for proper findings in accordance with the evidence). 
The state attempts to distinguish Giron, Lopez, Rucker, and Genovesi. It claims 
those cases do not involve "alternative grounds for affirmance." (Brief of Resp. at 11-
12.) By that statement, the state seems to claim competing standards exist for remanding 
cases in this jurisdiction. (See Brief of Resp. 11-12, 9 ). 
The state's argument should be disregarded as set forth supra, in subpoint B, 
above. The state's competing standards for an evidentiary hearing on remand (which 
would permit a prosecutor to withhold evidence and argument in order that he may test a 
new theory on appeal) offend public policy, and should be rejected. 
In the event this Court considers it necessary to remand this case to the trial court 
for any further proceedings, remand should be limited to findings on the existing record 
relating to application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the Brief of Petitioner and herein, Topanotes respect-
fully requests that this Court vacate the court of appeals' remand order as it relates to the 
inevitable-discovery doctrine. In addition, Topanotes requests that this Court rule on the 
state's newly raised ground for affirmance, and reject it on the existing record. 
In the event this Court deems it necessary to remand this case to the trial court for 
further proceedings, Topanotes respectfully requests that this Court specifically limit the 
matter to a remand for proceedings on the existing record. 
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